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INTRODUCTION 
A world we could have only envisioned a few 
years ago is becoming a reality. Cars are learning 
how to drive themselves and are expected to 
heavily reduce traffic accidents and transform 
our cities1. Machine learning algorithms have 
started to reshape medical care and research. 
Physicians are already using them to identify 
high-impact molecules for drug development2 
and to accelerate skin cancer diagnosis, 
reaching an accuracy on-par with dermatologists 
in the lab3. A recent report by McKinsey found 
that 45 percent of all work activities could soon 
be automated using artifi cial intelligence (AI)4. AI 
is changing our economy and will have a radical 
impact on how we work, live, and interact.
Developing solutions allowing AI algorithms to 
learn from large-scale, often sensitive datasets, 
while preserving people’s privacy is one of the 





3  Esteva, A., Kuprel, B., Novoa, R. A., Ko, J., Swetter, S. M., Blau, 
H. M., & Thrun, S. (2017), Dermatologist-level classifi cation of skin 
cancer with deep neural networks. Nature, 542 (7639); 115-118.
4  McKinsey Global Institute (2016), The age of analytics: Competing 
in a data-driven world, McKinsey.
Artifi cial Intelligence (AI) has potential 
to fundamentally change the way we 
work, live, and interact. There is however 
no general AI out there and the accuracy 
of current machine learning models 
largely depend on the data on which they 
have been trained on. For the coming 
decades, the development of AI will 
depend on access to ever larger and 
richer medical and behavioral datasets. 
We now have strong evidence that the 
tool we have used historically to fi nd 
a balance between using the data in 
aggregate and protecting people’s 
privacy, de-identifi cation, does not scale 
to big data datasets. The development 
and deployment of modern privacy-
enhancing technologies (PET), allowing 
data controllers to make data available in 
a safe and transparent way, will be key to 
unlocking the great potential of AI.
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We are unlikely to see any ‘general AI’—machines that could learn the way we do 
and successfully perform a large range of task—anytime soon
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However, despite what the popular press would have us believe, 
AI bears very little resemblance to human intelligence (or Skynet 
for that matter). This is unlikely to change anytime soon. Instead, 
experts in its most popular branch, machine learning, have spent 
decades training a large ecosystem of advanced statistical models 
to learn from data. These are crafted for specific tasks such as 
inferring human emotions from text messages5; e.g. if a certain 
combination of words express a positive, negative or, neutral 
tone; or detecting and classifying cancerous lesions in pictures 
the way a dermatologist would. We are unlikely to see any ‘general 
AI’ — machines that could learn the way we do and successfully 
perform a large range of task — anytime soon6. Access to rich and 
large-scale datasets will thus be crucial to the development of AI in 
the coming decades.
This is particularly visible when considering the latest “advance” 
in AI: Deep Learning. Techniques very similar to Deep Learning 
(i.e. Deep Neural Networks), have been around for a long time. 
Neural Networks date back to the 1950s, and many of the key 
algorithmic breakthroughs occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. While 
the increase in computing power7, in particular the advent of GPUs, 
has contributed to the recent success of deep learning, most of the 
increase in accuracy is arguably due to the availability of large-scale 
datasets8. As in Peter Norvig’s seminal article in 20099, one can 
notice the unreasonable effectiveness of data: corpora of millions of 
speech records, hi-res images, and human metadata.
Other examples include the use of large-scale Facebook data to build 
“psychometric profi les” of 220M American citizens by Cambridge 
Analytica10. Their work in identifying an individual’s gender, sexual 
orientation, political beliefs, and personality traits has been credited 
to have infl uenced the 2017 US presidential elections11. However, the 
research that underpins part of their work12 as well as a lot of the 
analysis that has been made public13 is fairly simple technically. Here 
again good accuracy e.g. on personality traits could be achieved 
with a lot of data and a simple linear regression.
While fueling fantastic progress in AI, this data and its collection and 
use by AI algorithms also raises privacy concerns that need to be 
addressed. The vast majority of this data, such as Facebook Likes, 
is personal. Produced by individuals going through their daily lives: 
making calls, visiting the doctor, using the GPS on their phone or 
car, etc. it contains detailed and often sensitive information about 
people’s behavior, medical conditions, travel habits, and lifestyles 
and can be used to infer further information.
5  Liu, B., 2012. Sentiment analysis and opinion mining. Synthesis lectures on human language 
technologies, 5(1), pp.1-167.
6  Etzioni, O. (2016), No, the Experts Don’t Think Superintelligent AI is a Threat to Humanity, MIT 
Technology Review.
7  Roger Parloff (2016), Why Deep Learning is Suddenly Changing Your Life, Fortune, http://fortune.
com/ai-artifi cial-intelligence-deep-machine-learning.
8  Sun, C., Shrivastava, A., Singh, S. and Gupta, A., 2017. Revisiting unreasonable effectiveness of 
data in deep learning era. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.02968.
9  Halevy, A., Norvig, P. and Pereira, F., 2009. The unreasonable effectiveness of data. IEEE 
Intelligent Systems, 24(2), pp.8-12.
10  Green, J. and Issenberg, S. (2017), Trump’s Data Team Saw a Different America—and They Were 
Right, Bloomberg, bloom.bg/2eEWfeO.
11  Thompson-Fields, D. (2017), Did artifi cial intelligence infl uence Brexit and Trump win?, Access 
AI, http://access-ai.com/news/21/artifi cial-intelligence-infl uence-brexit-trump-win.
12  Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D. and Graepel, T., 2013. Private traits and attributes are predictable from 




AI has immense potential  for good but the 
continuous access to always larger and richer 
datasets it requires will only be sustainable if this 
can be done while preserving people’s privacy. 
Developing solutions allowing AI algorithms to 
learn from large-scale, often sensitive datasets, 
while preserving people’s privacy is one of the 
main challenges we are facing today.
Historically, the balance between using the 
data and preserving people’s privacy has relied, 
both practically and legally, on the concept of 
data anonymization. Data anonymization is 
achieved through a series of techniques used 
to disassociate an individual’s record from their 
identity in a particular dataset. If the data cannot 
be associated with the individual to whom it 
relates, it cannot harm that person.
In practice, datasets are rendered anonymous 
through a combination of pseudonymization and 
anonymization (also called de-identification). 
The former, pseudonymization, is the process 
of replacing clear identifiers, such as names or 
account numbers, by pseudonyms. This is only the 
fi rst line of defence as pseudonymization alone has 
been shown to not be suffi cient. In the late 1990s, 
the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission 
released “anonymized” data containing every 
hospital visit made by state employees. The then 
governor of Massachusetts, William Weld, assured 
that GIC had protected patient privacy by deleting 
identifi ers. By using the public electoral rolls of the 
city of Cambridge, MIT student Latanya Sweeney 
was able to re-identify (linking data back to a 
person) the medical records of the governor using 
his date of birth, sex, and postcode and sent his 
medical records to his offi ce14. 
The second line of defence, de-identification, 
was then developed to prevent re-identification, 
allowing once again for data to be used while 
pres er v ing people’s  pr ivacy.  The f i rs t  de-
14  Sweeney, L., 2000. Simple demographics often identify people 
uniquely. Health (San Francisco), 671, pp.1-34.
“DEVELOPING SOLUTIONS 
ALLOWING AI ALGORITHMS TO 
LEARN FROM LARGE-SCALE, OFTEN 
SENSITIVE DATASETS, WHILE 
PRESERVING PEOPLE’S PRIVACY IS 
ONE OF THE MAIN CHALLENGES WE 
ARE FACING TODAY.”
Will we succeed in making 
the AI revolution work for everyone? 
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identification criteria, k-anonymity15, and an 
algorithm to achieve it, were proposed directly 
af ter Latanya Sweeney’s at tack. A dataset 
is said to be k-anonymous if no combination 
of user attributes (e.g. year of birth, sex, and 
postcode) are shared by fewer than k individuals. 
This makes it impossible to uniquely identify a 
specifi c person in the dataset as any information 
collected will always lead us to a group of at 
least k individuals. Datasets can be modified in 
various ways to make them k-anonymous: values 
in the dataset are coarsened (e.g. by recording 
the age range of a person rather than their exact 
age), cer tain attributes (columns) or users 
(rows) can be removed, etc. These principles of 
generalisation and deletion along with others 
underpin all algorithms designed to enforce 
k-anonymity. Extensions of k-anonymity, such as 
l-diversity16 and t-closeness17, have furthermore 
been proposed to protect against more complex 
inference attacks. 
This combination of pseudonymization and de-
identification worked quite well for about 15 
to 20 years. However, modern datasets, and 
especially the datasets used by AI, are very 
different from those used in the mid 90s. Today’s 
datasets, coming from phones, browsers, IoT, or 
smart-cities, are high-dimensional: they contain 
for each individual hundreds or thousands of 
pieces of information about him and the way he 
behaves. Mobile phone metadata contain all the 
places where an individual has used their phone, 
sometimes for years. Web browsing data contain 
every single pages you have visited while a human 
genome is composed of approx. 21,000 genes.
This fun damental ly  changes the abi l i t y  of 
anonymization methods to effectively protect 
people’s privacy while allowing the data to be used. 
Following several high-profi le re-identifi cation of 
behavioral datasets18 19, the concept of unicity was 
introduced in 2013 to evaluate the effectiveness 
of anonymization in modern datasets. Unicity, 
estimates the fraction of users that are uniquely 
identifi ed by a number of randomly chosen pieces 
of information an adversary could have access to. 
A study based on mobile phone metadata, showed 
15  Sweeney, L. (2002). k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. 
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based 
Systems, 10(05), 557-570.
16  Machanavajjhala, A., Gehrke, J., Kifer, D., & Venkitasubramaniam, 
M. (2006, April). l-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity. In Data 
Engineering, 2006. ICDE’06. Proceedings of the 22nd International 
Conference on (pp. 24-24). IEEE.
17  Li, N., Li, T., & Venkatasubramanian, S. (2007). t-closeness: Privacy 
beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity. In Data Engineering, 2007. ICDE 
2007. IEEE 23rd International Conference on (pp. 106-115). IEEE.
18 Michael Arrington (August 6, 2006). “AOL proudly releases massive 
amounts of user search data”. TechCrunch. Retrieved August 7, 2006
19  Narayanan, A. and Shmatikov, V., 2006. How to break anonymity of 
the netfl ix prize dataset. arXiv preprint cs/0610105.
that just 4 points—approximate times and places—are sufficient 
to uniquely identify 95% of people in a dataset of 1.5 million 
individuals20. This means that knowing where and when an individual 
was a mere 4 times in the span of 15 months is, on average, suffi cient 
to re-identify them in a simply anonymized mobile phone dataset, 
unraveling their entire location history.
Originally obtained in a European country, these results have now 
been replicated several times. A 2015 study looks at a dataset of 
1M people in Latin America21 while another replicates the results 
on a dataset of 0.5M individuals in a third country22. In 2015, the 
same methodology was applied to bank transaction data (credit 
and debit cards). This study, published in Science, concluded that 
4 points — date and place of a purchase—were here again suffi cient 
to uniquely identify 90% of people among one million credit 
card users23.
While pseudonymization and simple anonymization utterly fail to 
protect people’s privacy could generalisation, deletion, and other 
methods throw people off the scent again? Unfortunately, for both 
mobile phones and credit cards data, the answer is a resounding ‘no’. 
The same is likely to be true for other large-scale behavioral datasets 
such as browsing, IoT data etc. The above studies demonstrate 
that adding noise or reducing the spatial or temporal resolution of 
data makes identification only marginally more difficult. Indeed, 
even in a very low-resolution mobile phone dataset24, 10 points are 
enough to fi nd a person more than 50% of the time25. Surprisingly 
perhaps, in the credit card study, knowing just 10 instances of when 
an individual has visited any one of 350 stores in a two-week period 
would result in a correct re-identifi cation 80% of the time26. Deletion 
has mathematically the same marginal effect on the likelihood of re-
identifi cation.
These results has let researchers to conclude that “we have 
currently no reason to believe that an effi cient enough, yet general, 
anonymisation method will ever exist for high-dimensional data, 
as all the evidence so far points to the contrary. The current 
de-identification model, where the data are anonymised and 
released, is obsolete”27. An opinion shared by President’s [Obama] 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology who concluded 
that anonymisation “ is not robust against near-term future 
re-identifi cation methods. PCAST does not see it as being a useful 
basis for policy”28. 
20  de Montjoye, Y. A., Hidalgo, C. A., Verleysen, M., & Blondel, V. D. (2013). Unique in the crowd: 
The privacy bounds of human mobility. Scientifi c reports, 3, 1376.
21  U.N. Global Pulse. Mapping the risk-utility landscape of mobile phone data for sustainable 
development & humanitarian action, 2015.
22  Yi Song, Daniel Dahlmeier, and Stephane Bressan. Not so unique in the crowd:a simple and 
effective algorithm for anonymizing location data. ACM PIR, 2014.
23  de Montjoye, Y. A., Radaelli, L., & Singh, V. K. (2015). Unique in the shopping mall: On the 
reidentifi ability of credit card metadata. Science, 347(6221), 536-539.
24  With the resolution reduced by a factor of 15 both temporally and spatially, approx. 15km² and 
15 hours.
25  de Montjoye, Y. A., Hidalgo, C. A., Verleysen, M., & Blondel, V. D. (2013). Unique in the crowd: 
The privacy bounds of human mobility. Scientifi c reports, 3, 1376.
26  de Montjoye, Y. A., Radaelli, L., & Singh, V. K. (2015). Unique in the shopping mall: On the 
reidentifi ability of credit card metadata. Science, 347(6221), 536-539.
27  de Montjoye, Y-A and Pentland, A, Response to Comment on “Unique in the shopping mall: 
On the re-identifi ability of credit card metadata”, 351, 6279, 1274--1274 (2016)




To make the matter worse, modern datasets are not only impossible 
to anonymize but also extremely rich. In the past, it was suffi cient 
to look through the data to assess the potential damage of re-
identification (e.g. whether these are medical records or fairly 
innocuous data). Sometimes sensitive information could even be 
removed to make the data “non”-sensitive (e.g. removing the fact 
that people might have watched specifi c movies). As we have seen 
in the Cambridge Analytica example, this doesn’t work anymore 
with modern high-dimensional datasets. Their richness means 
that the sensitivity of the dataset might not be directly visible but 
instead come from what can be inferred from it. To assess the 
sensitivity of the data, one would needs to guess what an algorithm 
could possibly infer about an individual from his data, now or in the 
future. For instance, it has been shown that personality traits29, 
demographics30, socioeconomic status31,32, or even loan repayment 
rates33 can all be predicted from seemingly innocuous mobile phone 
data. This “risk of inference” in big data renders comprehensive risk 
assessments incredibly challenging — some would say impossible — 
to perform.
With the traditional de-identifi cation model failing us how do we 
move forward training machine learning models on large-scale 
datasets in a way that truly preserves individuals’ privacy?
Back in the 90s, when the first de-identification algorithms were 
developed, data transfer was exceedingly costly. Anonymizing the 
dataset once and for all and sending a copy of it to the analyst was 
the only feasible solution. 20 years later with internet, the cloud, and 
arrays of GPU powered machines, this is no longer the case. Data 
controllers can easily grant remote, tightly controlled and monitored 
access to datasets for training purposes instead of sharing the 
“anonymized” raw records — bringing algorithms to the sensitive 
data instead of the sending data to the algorithms.
For example, the OPen ALgorithms (OPAL) project34, recently 
funded by the French Development Agency (AFD), is based on this 
framework. Led by the Computational Privacy Group at Imperial 
College London, in partnership35 with Telefonica and Orange, 
OPAL aims to allow third parties to safely use the geolocation data 
through a questions-and-answers model. In short, the platform 
allows third-parties, such as researchers, to submit algorithms that 
will be trained on the data. The privacy of individuals is ensured 
through a series of control mechanisms put in place. For example, 
the platform validates the code before training the model; it ensures 
that only aggregated results sometimes with a little bit of noise are 
returned36, ensuring that no single individual can be identifi ed; and 
29  de Montjoye, Y. A., Quoidbach, J., Robic, F., & Pentland, A. (2013, April). Predicting Personality 
Using Novel Mobile Phone-Based Metrics. In SBP (pp. 48-55).
30  Felbo, B., Sundsøy, P., Pentland, A. S., Lehmann, S., & de Montjoye, Y. A. (2015). Using 
deep learning to predict demographics from mobile phone metadata. arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1511.06660.
31  Jahani, E., Sundsøy, P., Bjelland, J., Bengtsson, L., & de Montjoye, Y. A. (2017). Improving offi cial 
statistics in emerging markets using machine learning and mobile phone data. EPJ Data Science, 
6(1), 3.
32  de Montjoye, Y. A., Rocher, L., & Pentland, A. S. (2016). Bandicoot: a python toolbox for mobile 
phone metadata. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 17(175), 1-5.
33  Bjorkegren, D., & Grissen, D. (2015). Behavior revealed in mobile phone usage predicts loan 
repayment.
34 Open Algorithms (2017), OPAL, www.opalproject.org/.
35  Other partners include: Data-Pop Alliance, MIT and the World Economic Forum
36  See e.g. differential privacy Dwork, C., 2008, April. Differential privacy: A survey of results. 
In International Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation (pp. 1-19). 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
it records every interaction in a tamper-proof 
ledger ensuring auditability of the system. The 
combination of access-control mechanisms, 
code sandboxing, aggregation schemes, etc 
allows OPAL to guarantee that data is being used 
anonymously by machine learning algorithms and 
that even if the data itself is only pseudonymous.
Recognizing the issue, several other privacy-
enhancing technologies (PET) are being developed 
to al low datasets to be used in  a  pr ivacy-
conscientious way through a mix of access-control, 
security based, and auditing mechanisms. Google’s 
DeepMind is, for instance, developing an auditable 
system to train machine learning algorithms 
on individual-level health data records from the 
National Health Service37 in the UK. Their ‘Verifi able 
Data Audit’ ensures that any interaction with the 
data is recorded and accessible to mitigate the risk 
of foul play. The French government also developed 
a similar solution, the Secure Data Access Centre 
(CASD)38, to allow researchers to build statistical 
models  using publ ic  surveys and nat ional 
censuses through remote access and smartcard 
technologies.
AI and machine learning could revolutionize 
the way we work and live. Their potential is 
however crucially dependent on access to large 
and high-quality datasets for algorithms to be 
trained on. The way we have historically found a 
balance between using the data in aggregate and 
protecting people’s privacy, de-identification, 
does not scale to the big data datasets used by 
modern algorithms. Moving forward, it is both 
crucial for our algorithms to be trained on the best 
available datasets out there and to do so in a way 
that truly protects the privacy of the individuals. 
The successful future of AI requires us to rethink 
our approach to data protection. Solutions like 
OPAL are at the forefront of this effort, forming the 
bedrock of safely using large-scale sensitive data 
for the public good.
37  Suleyman, M., Laurie, B, (2017), Trust, confi dence and Verifi able 
Data Audit, DeepMind Blog, https://deepmind.com/blog/trust-
confi dence-verifi able-data-audit.
38 Centre d’accès Sécurisé aux Données, CASD, https://casd.eu/en.
“THE COMBINATION OF ACCESS-CONTROL 
MECHANISMS, CODE SANDBOXING, 
AGGREGATION SCHEMES, ETC. ALLOWS 
OPAL TO GUARANTEE THAT DATA IS 
BEING USED ANONYMOUSLY BY MACHINE 
LEARNING ALGORITHMS AND THAT EVEN IF 
THE DATA ITSELF IS ONLY PSEUDONYMOUS.”
Will we succeed in making 
the AI revolution work for everyone? 
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